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Joseph F. Johnson
Dept. of Mathematical Sciences, Villanova Univ.
RESUMEN
Hay esbozos segu´n los cuales las probabilidades se cuentan como la fundacio´n
de la teor´ıa matema´tica de las estad´ısticas. Mas la significacio´n f´ısica de las prob-
abilidades matema´ticas son oscuros, muy poco entendidos. Parec´ıera mejor que
las probabilidades f´ısicas se fundaran en las estad´ısticas descriptivas de datos fisi-
cales. Se trata una teor´ıa que as´ı responde a una cuestiona de Hilbert propuesta
en su Problema Nu´mero Seis, la axiomatizacio´n de la F´ısica. Esta esta´ basada
en la auto-correlacio´n de los series temporales. Casi todas de las funciones de
auto-correlacio´n de las trayector´ıas de un sistema dina´mico lineal (con un num-
bero bastante grande de grados de libertad) son todas aproximadamente iguales,
no importan las condiciones iniciales, au´n si el sistema no sea ergo´dico, como
conjeturo´ Khintchine en 1943.
Usually, the theory of probability has been made the foundation for the
theory of statistics. But the physical significance of the concept of probability
is problematic, with no consensus. It would seem better to make the descriptive
statistics of physical data the foundations of physical probability. This will answer
a question posed by Hilbert in his Sixth Problem, the axiomatization of Physics.
It is based on the auto-correlation function of time series. Almost all trajectories
of a linear dynamical system (with sufficiently many degrees of freedom) are
approximately equal, no matter their initial conditions, even when the system is
not ergodic, as conjectured by Khintchine in 1943.
Introduction
Hilbert’s Sixth Problem [1] was the Axiomatization of Physics. He had in mind not
only the axiomatization of true physical theories, but as well the axiomatization of false
theories which would bear an interesting resemblance to, along with instructive differences
from, the real world. Because of the contemporary controversies about the logical relation
between Analytical Mechanics and Thermodynamics precipitated by the work of Maxwell
and Boltzmann, which involved both Poincare´ and Zermelo, Hilbert explicitly pointed to
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the need for logical foundations for the theory of probability. With Quantum Mechanics’s
Born’s rule’s having placed probability at an even more central location in the foundations
of physical theory, Hilbert’s prescience is remarkable. Readers younger than Hilbert little
realize that for Hilbert and his generation, Probability was not a branch of Mathematics,
it was a branch of Physics.* Hilbert realized that as a preliminary to this, one would
have to bring the theory of probability into mathematics proper by axiomatizing it in
such a way as to clarify its relationships to Arithmetic or Geometry. Fre´chet, Wiener,
and Kolmogoroff did precisely this, but Kolmogoroff well knew that this did not solve
the problem of clarifying the logical foundations of what is nowadays called “physical
probability.” He returned to this more difficult and more important part of Hilbert’s Sixth
Problem several times in his later career [3].
In Dirac’s formulation of the axioms of Quantum Mechanics, we find the typical
physicist’s approach to this problem.
“If the experiment is repeated a large number of times it will be found that
each particular result will be obtained a definite fraction of the total number of
times, so that one can say there is a definite probability of its being obtained any
time the experiment is performed.” [4]
This is not a definition at all. Such notions have been insightfully criticized in print
by Burnside [5], Littlewood [6], and Kolmogoroff [7], all three accomplished probabilists.
* This point is illustrated by Corry: he found in the Go¨ttingen archives the list of topics
for a course Hilbert taught: “In 1905 he taught a course on the axiomatic method where
he presented for the first time a panoramic view of various physical disciplines from an
axiomatic perspective: mechanics, thermodynamics, probability calculus, kinetic theory,
insurance mathematics, electrodynamics, psychophysics.” [2]
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In an address to a math club, Littlewood explained at length “The Dilemma of Probability
Theory.”
“Now [it] cannot assert a certainty about a particular number n of throws,
such as ‘the proportion of 6’s will certainly be within p± ǫ for large enough n . . .
It can only say ‘the proportion will lie within p ± ǫ with at least such and such
probability (depending on ǫ and no) . . .
“The vicious circle is apparent.”
“It is natural to believe that if (with the natural reservations) an act like
throwing a die is repeated n times the proportion of 6’s will, with certainty, tend
to a limit, p say, as n → ∞. (Attempts are made to sublimate the limit into
some Pickwickian sense—‘limit’ in inverted commas. But either you mean the
ordinary limit, or else you have the problem of explaining how ‘limit’ behaves,
and you are no further. You do not make an illegitimate conception legitimate
by putting it into inverted commas.) . . .
“It is generally agreed that the frequency theory won’t work. But whatever
the theory it is clear that the vicious circle is very deep-seated: certainty being
impossible, whatever [it] is made to state can be stated only in terms of ‘prob-
ability’. One is tempted to the extreme rashness of saying that the problem is
insoluble (within our current conceptions). More sophisticated attempts than the
frequency theory have been made, but they fail in the same sort of way.”
Kolmogoroff, in a chapter [7] meant for a broad scientific audience, analyzed this
logical circularity in the same way, and ten years later, having despaired of the possiblity
of fixing the frequency theory, began developing his theory of algorithmic complexity as
the logical foundation for probability.
However, we can answer Littlewood’s objection by, indeed, carefully defining a new
kind of limit, which we will call the thermodynamic limit, which evades the logical circle of
the naive frequency theory but still has physical meaning and close contact with the kind
of physical content which physicists like about the frequency theory, in spite of its logical
shortcomings.
The well known logician and computer scientist Prof. Jan von Plato, of Helsinki
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University, succeeded in giving a definition of probability for ergodic systems [8]. His
definition is rather different from the one which will be given here, cannot be made to
work for quantum systems [9], and because it does not use Khintchine’s conjectures about
the thermodynamic limit, is restricted to ergodic classical systems.
A sequence of dynamical systems
Suppose given a sequence Mn of dynamical systems, each one with n degrees of free-
dom, and equipped with a flow x 7→ xt and an invariant measure under the flow, µn.
Suppose given an observable (i.e., a measurable function) fn on each Mn. To simplify
notation, if vn ∈ Mn is a perhaps implicitly fixed initial condition, we write fn(t) for
fn((vn)t), the change in f due to the flow. The motivation is that we are interested in
{Mn} when in some sense they are all ‘the same’ kind of physical system, only the number
of degrees of freedom increases without bound, and fn is ‘the same’ physical quantity,
e.g., momentum. We will, inspired by a conjecture of Khintchine’s, define the limit of
Mn which, when it exists, is independent of the substitution of the µn by any other µ
′
n
absolutely continuous with respect to µn.
For f a measurable function of time, Wiener studied the auto-correlation function
ϕf (τ) = lim
T→∞
1
2T
∫ T
−T
f(t+ τ)f(t)dt.
When one views f as an observable on Mn, it is a set of data, a time series, and its
auto-correlation function is a descriptive statistic of this set of data.
Wiener further defined the higher correlation functions for any positive integer m,
ϕmf (τ1, τ2, . . . , τm) = lim
T→∞
1
2T
∫ T
−T
Πm1 f(t+ τi)dt.
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There is no dependence on the notion of probability. In the literature, there is a
conflicting definition of the auto-correlation function R(τ) of a time series, which only
applies to a time series which is not data, but really a stochastic process. That is, suppose
given a probability space P with probability measure µ, and for each α ∈ P , suppose
that fα(t) is a time series in the usual sense. Then the phase auto-correlation function was
defined by Khintchine several years after Wiener’s work to be R(t, τ) =
∫
P
fα(t)fα(t+τ)dµ,
and is independent of t if the process is stationary (the notion of stationary seems to have
been introduced by Khintchine at the same time). The whole point here is to avoid using
it, since that might seem to re-introduce the logical circle Littlewood complained about.
The whole point of thermodynamics is to convert a sequence of deterministic dynam-
ical systems into a stochastic process by passing to whatever kind of thermodynamic limit
one has defined. Ours will be a new kind, not the same as the usual one. Balian has called
for the creation of new kinds of thermodynamic limits, each one tailored for the application
at hand.
Definition. In the setting above, the sequence {(Mn, µn), fn} is said to have a thermody-
namic limit if for every choice of a compact subset K of the time-axis, a positive ǫ, and a
positive integer M , there exists an integer N so large that for every n ≥ N , there exists
a subset Nn of Mn with µn(Mn rNn) < ǫ such that for any two initial conditions v and
w ∈ Nn,
|ϕmv (t1, t2, . . . , tm)− ϕ
m
w (t1, t2, . . . , tm)| < ǫ
for all ti ∈ K and all m < M . Here, ϕ
m
v is the m-point auto-correlation function of fv(t) =
fn(vt), and similarly for ϕ
m
w . The trajectories (or, equivalently, their initial conditions)
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belonging to Nn are called normal and Nn is called a normal cell.
It is obvious that there then exists a function ϕ∞ defined for all time such that
limn→∞ ϕn converges to ϕ∞ with uniform convergence on compact sets, provided ϕn is
chosen to have an initial condition from Nn. Similarly for ϕ
m
∞. The invariance under
replacing µn by any νn absolutely continuous with respect to µn is also obvious.
Le´vy’s philosophy was that in order to study a stochastic process, it suffices to study
R(τ), its auto-correlation function (in the sense of Khintchine) [10]. A Gaussian stationary
centered stochastic process is determined up to equivalence by R. Wiener has also remarked
[11] that even a non-Gaussian one is still determined up to some sort of equivalence by the
knowledge of all its higher m-point auto-correlation functions Rm.
Since we have a set of suitable m-point correlation functions, we would be able to
define a limit object of a sequence that has a thermodynamic limit: the stochastic process
whose auto-correlation functions in the sense of Khintchine are equal to the limits of the
descriptive statistics of the elements of our sequence. But we do not need to define some
sort of limit object such as this for our immediate purposes. For now, we will regard φ∞
and f∞ as the limit. One would also like to define a suitable equivalence relation on the
space of sequences which possess limits and study the space of equivalence classes. Like
some other Hilbert problems, the solution to the Sixth opens up many avenues for further
research.
The definition of event and of probability
The mathematical axiomization of probability theory has taught us that it is just as
important to precisely specify what is an event as it is to associate a number to an event.
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This, indeed, is a foundational point difficult for engineers or physicists to appreciate; they
tend to feel that every subset is measurable. In fact, the definition of Lebesgue measure
formalizes an intuition about what a ‘physically constructible’ subset of Euclidean space
should be, so in a sense, non-measurable sets cannot have any physical significance.
In Quantum Mechanics, there has been the intuition that probabilities arise from the
necessity of amplifying a microscopic event up to the macroscopic level (e.g., Feynman
in [12]). In Classical Mechanics, there has been the intuition that probability arises in
the thermodynamic limit of deterministic systems. (There have also been rival intuitions
but we will not touch on them here.) It follows from this that we should formally define
an ‘event’ to be something that only arises in this way, when two contrasting scales are
being compared. In particular, neither points nor subsets of a fixed Mn are events. (And
for this reason, neither Lebesgue measure nor Liouville measure nor µn are interpreted
as probability measures.) Taking our cue from Quantum Mechanics, only the result of a
measurement is defined to be an event.
The quantum case was already treated, in the special case of the two slit experiment,
in [13] and [14]. There, ‘event’ was defined as the thermodynamic limit of the result of
an interaction with an amplifying apparatus: in that limit, Planck’s constant goes to zero
and the amplifying apparatus becomes a classical system.
In the classical case, in Statistical Mechanics, as remarked by Wiener [15], Guelfand
[16], and Pauli [17], a measurement of an observable f on M is really a long-time average,
modelled or approximated by the infinite time average
〈f〉t = lim
T→∞
1
T
∫ T
0
f(t)dt,
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where the dependence on the initial condition vo ∈ Mn has been suppressed. The same
applies to any function of f , for example, the variance f2.* However, this dependence on
the initial condition prevents us from turning this idea into an exact definition of event,
and this is the reason we pass to the thermodynamic limit. As the number of degrees of
freedom grows without bound, almost all initial conditions give approximately the same
answer, the expectation of f , and ϕ∞(0) for the variance. We also obtain all the higher
moments of the limit of f , and so a random variable f∞ can be rigorously defined (as usual,
its probability space M∞ is taken to be the unit interval [0,1] with Lebesgue measure).
Physically, f∞ is an idealisation with properties which are good approximations to the vast
majority of the 〈fn〉t, 〈f
2
n〉t, etc., each of which is a descriptive statistic of some concrete
data.
Suppose given a sequence {(Mn, µn), fn} which has a thermodynamic limit, with its
associated ϕ∞, f∞, etc., as above.
Definition. Let the probability space P be the direct image under f∞ of the probability
space (M∞, dx). Then the events of the thermodynamic limit of {(Mn, µn), fn} are the
measurable subsets of P and the probability of an event F is its measure.
The definition of limit we have introduced is modelled closely on the equilibrium statis-
tical mechanics and work of Ford, Kac, and Mazur [18]. For this reason, the measurement
yields one value with probability unity, because the system is in equilibrium.
In fact, this limit was tailor-made for measurements of f , but it will apply as well to
* In the author’s view, and in the views just cited, time averages model measure-
ments and phase averages model probabilities. Prof. von Plato, following Einstein and in
agreement with Landau, defines probabilities as infinite time averages.
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any function of f . If f models the coin-toss (or cast of a die) dilemma of Littlewood,*
then f will be assumed to take only the values ±12 , and be centered. Composing f with
the indicator function of a small neighbourhood of 12 , we get g (or, just put g = f +
1
2 ).
Then 〈g〉t = the frequency of heads.† This frequency might be zero, if the initial condition
is perverse. Putting g∞ = f∞ +
1
2 , all the moments of g∞ follow from those of f∞. In
particular, the expectation of g∞, which is our definition of the probability that f takes
the value “heads,” depends only on the equivalence class of the sequence {(Mn, µn), fn}.
The physical meaning is that if the sequence was defined shrewdly, then it is a good
approximation to 〈g6.2·1023〉t (a physically meaningful function) unless the initial condition
does not belong to Nn, which is a determinate statement with concrete physical meaning.
Of course the limit of the sequence does not change, and hence 〈g∞〉µ does not change, if
any finite number ofMn are replaced by ridiculous counterfeits, and this includesM6.2·1023.
In this case, the statement will be useless for any practical purpose, but still physically
meaningful. The same applies if the initial condition is, in fact, outside of N6.2·1023. The
statement will be meaningful but useless for this particular case. Many have already
suspected that the true meaning of probability is an approximate one with a certain range
of validity, and when used outside the limits of that range, will lead to paradoxes or
* If one were to construct the obvious stochastic process from the idea of repeated
coint-tossing, the process would not be stationary in continuous time. But in our use of
descriptive statistics, there is no assumption of stationarity.
† For us, frequency is not equal to probability. What is measured is frequency. The
frequency is related in a subtle way to the probability, just as time averages are related to
phase averages.
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practically useless statements. And the point of the Hilbert problem is only to tidy the
logical structure of probability statements, not to impose a tidiness on the world that does
not exist.
Ever since the work of Wiener, physicists and engineers have had the intuition that a
time series whose auto-correlation function has an absolutely continuous power spectrum
is “random.” This can be made precise in the context of our definition. If the coin-tosses
result from {(Mn, µn), fn}, as above, then we can use the auto-correlation of a sequence
of unit pulses as a measure of how random the sequence is. If its auto-correlation function
is normal, i.e., approximately equal to that of all the others from Nn, then the sequence is
approximately random. Thus, the auto-correlation function can be used instead of ideas
of algorithmic complexity.
The assertion that the probabilities in the thermodynamic limit are good approxima-
tions to the real situation of M6.2·1023 is testable, by experiment. In principle, one should,
in many concrete cases of this limit, be able to calculate how large n has to be. If the
predictions based on calculations using the limit are falsified by an experimental run, then
vo /∈ Nn. That said, the practical purpose of using thermodynamic limits is precisely to
avoid having to make calculations aboutMn, which are practically impossible, substituting
for them calculations about M∞, which are easier.
A class of examples
We will show that this definition is not vacuous by studying an interesting class of
examples: Hamiltonian systems of linearly coupled harmonic oscillators. These systems are
completely integrable, but in the limit, they exhibit the kind of very very weak ergodicity
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conjectured by Khintchine in 1943 [19] for a (hopefully) much larger class of dynamical
systems (he did not concretely specify which class). The first point is that the systems are
simple enough that the calculations for Mn can be carried out. The second point is that
ergodicity is usually associated with non-linearity, but here are linear systems which on
the macro-level are practically indistinguishable from ergodic systems.
The third point is that from the standpoint of the foundations of Physics, only Quan-
tum Mechanics is truly important, not Classical Mechanics, and quantum systems are
linear Hamiltonian systems. So we will study the general class of linearly coupled har-
monic oscillators as in [20].
Obviously not every sequence of systems Mn, even if possessing a limit, will exhibit
weakly ergodic behaviour even if n, the dimension of the space, increases without bound.
The intuition from equilibrium statistical mechanics is that each Mn must be composed
of many identical parts (or, more generally, a fixed number of different types of parts
with the number of parts of the same type increasing without bound), and there must
be a coupling between the parts. Furthermore, a natural hypothesis to make is that the
interaction between part i and part j only depends on the relative situation of i and j, so
that if k and l constitute a parallel pair, their interaction term should be the same. This
leads naturally to the study of an interaction matrix An which is cyclic (and, of course,
symmetric).
We will generalize the result of [20], which in turn was a generalization of the results
of Ford, Kac, and Mazur [18]. The main point here is only to show how the new definition
of probability and event applies in this situation. The main interest is that the same kind
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of definition of probability and event works for classical physics as was used earlier, in [13]
and [14], for the quantum mechanical measurement of a two-state system by an amplifying
apparatus in a state of negative temperature. The second point of interest is that we
will have introduced the notion of probability without relying on imposing a particular
probability distribution on Mn. This opens the way, in the future, to studying systems in
a negative temperature state, where the usual notion of probability distribution cannot be
used.
Notation. If n is even, choose Mn to be the same as Mn−1. From now one, assume n is
odd, and equal to 2N + 1. All indices will run from −N to N , except angles, which will
run from epsilon above −π to epsilon below π: we put θl =
2pil
n
for l = −N, . . . , N .
Mn is a Hamiltonian dynamical system (or, rather, the restriction of one to a surface
of constant energy, see later) with canonical co-ordinates pi, qi and Hamiltonian Hn
Hn =
N∑
i=−N
p2i
2m
+
1
2
(q−N , q−N+1, . . . qN )A

q−N
q−N+1
...
qN

where A is a symmetric n× n square real matrix with positive eigenvalues ω2l satisfying
(A)ml =
1
n+ 1
N∑
k=−N
ω2ke
2pi
√
−1
n+1
k(m−l).
This is obviously symmetric if we make a simple assumption on the ωl’s.
We have
po(t) =
1
n
{∑
k
∑
l
cos(ωlt)ζ
−lkpk(0)−
∑
k
∑
l
ωl sin(ωlt)ζ
−lkqk(0)
}
.
Putting p̂(k) =
∑
i ζ
−ikpi(0) and similarly for q̂, this becomes
(1) po(t) =
1
n
{∑
k
p̂(k) cos(ωkt)−
∑
k
q̂(k)ωk sin(ωkt)
}
.
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Furthermore, the auto-correlation function of po is
(2) ϕ(τ) =
∑
k
1
2
(
1
2N + 1
)2
(|p̂(k)|2 + |ωk q̂(k)|
2) cos(ωkt),
and the higher auto-correlation functions vanish for an odd number of points and, for
an even number of points, are trigonometric polynomials with more or less the same
coefficients.
We will take po as our observable fn, and the restriction of Liouville measure to
any surface of constant energy E as our invariant measure µn. The dynamical system
Mn will be the surface of constant energy. The energy level En is defined for traditional
reasons, and to make the comparison with traditional results convenient, to be that energy
level which is most probable according to the Maxwell distribution: it is n
kT
, where k is
Boltzmann’s constant and T is the absolute temperature in degrees Kelvin.
To implement the notion that theMn are the same but different, we will suppose that
their eigenvalues are taken from the same function ω but evaluated at different points.
Suppose that we know the eigenvalues ωl for the real system M6.2·1023 which we are given.
Regarding ωl as a function of θl, write it as ω(θl) = ωl. But now regard ω as a continuous
function on (−π, π) by interpolating the given values in some sensible fashion. (One that
makes intuitive physical sense.)
For any n, define the Hamiltonian of Mn by putting ωs = ω(
2pis
n
). Then the sums in
Equation 1 become Riemann sums for the improper integrals
1
2π
∫ pi
−pi
p̂(θ) cos(ω(θ)t)dθ −
∫ pi
−pi
q̂(θ)ω(θ) sin(ω(θ)t)dθ.
Now the same methods of proof of the theorem of [20] show that
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Theorem. Suppose that ω is a continuous function on (−π, π) such that the Riemann
integrals ∫ pi−δ
−pi+δ
ω(θ) cos(mθ)dθ
converge for every m and every small positive δ. Using ω, define {(Mn, µn), fn} as above.
Then this sequence has a thermodynamic limit, and
ϕ∞(τ) =
1
2π
∫ pi
−pi
cos(ω(θ)τ)dθ.
Corollary. In fact, since the coefficients are more or less the same for all the higher
multi-point auto-correlation functions as they are for the ordinary one ϕ, the proof shows
more. It shows the uniformity in M of our estimates, and hence, this sequence satisfies a
stronger condition than is necessary for the definition of limit: the conclusion holds for all
m simultaneously.
We omit the details of the proof of the corollary.
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